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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A WARNING WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS: FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES TO THE FDA’S GRAPHIC WARNING LABEL
REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION
Every day, 3800 young Americans under the age of eighteen smoke their
first cigarette.1 One-fourth of high school seniors are regular smokers.2
Cigarette smoking continues to be the leading cause of preventable death in the
United States, accounting for approximately one out of every five deaths each
year.3 More than eighty percent of regular smokers have their first cigarette
before turning eighteen.4
These disturbing statistics, published in the most recent Surgeon General’s
report,5 demonstrate the imminent need for government action. In 2009,
Congress introduced the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
(the Act) to give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to
regulate tobacco products.6 One of the most aggressive anti-smoking
provisions of the Act requires new warning labels consisting of graphic images
to take up fifty percent of cigarette packages.7
Like all past tobacco warning label requirements, this latest legislation has
encountered much opposition from tobacco companies. Immediately after the
Act was signed into law, six tobacco companies filed suit against the
government challenging the constitutionality of several provisions, including
the graphic images.8 Two years later, after the FDA released the nine specific
required images,9 five tobacco companies again filed suit challenging the

1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG
YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL iii (2012) [hereinafter
PREVENTING TOBACCO USE].
2. Id. at 135.
3. Id. at i.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009).
7. Id. § 201(a), 123 Stat. at 1843.
8. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 520–21 (6th Cir.
2012).
9. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,628 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141 (2012)) [hereinafter Final Rule].
243
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specific images under the First Amendment.10 The suits have resulted in a
circuit split, with the Sixth Circuit upholding the graphic warnings as
constitutional11 and the D.C. Circuit striking them down as violating the First
Amendment.12
Part I of this Note discusses the historical background of tobacco warning
regulation in the United States. Part II explains the key provisions of the
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. Part III analyzes the
differences between the Sixth and D.C. Circuits’ contradicting rulings on First
Amendment challenges to the Act. Part IV suggests how the circuit split might
be resolved using the intermediate scrutiny standard applied by the D.C.
Circuit to reach the same conclusion as the Sixth Circuit in upholding the new
warning requirements as constitutional.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

Historical Overview of Tobacco Warning Regulations

Congress first required warnings on tobacco products in 1965 in response
to the landmark 1964 Surgeon General report Smoking and Health: Report of
the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service.13
This was the Surgeon General’s first report highlighting the deleterious health
consequences of smoking and declaring a causal relationship between smoking
and lung cancer.14 The report also found smokers to have a seventy percent
higher mortality rate and established a high correlation between smoking,
emphysema, and heart disease.15 The report resulted in a wave of public
concern; however, it did not set forth any specific policy recommendations.16
Within a week of its publication, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
proposed a rule requiring health warnings to be printed on cigarette packages.17
In the face of inevitable regulation, tobacco companies turned to the tobaccofriendly members of Congress to encourage legislative action.18

10. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
11. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569.
12. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222.
13. John Parascandola, Warning Labels, in TOBACCO IN HISTORY AND CULTURE: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 675, 675 (Jordan Goodman ed., 2004).
14. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 31–37
(1964).
15. Id. at 32–38.
16. Parascandola, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Congress responded quickly by enacting the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act of 1965 (the 1965 Act) requiring cigarette packages to
bear the warning, “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health.”19 Although the 1965 Act first introduced the warning label
requirement, it was also heavily protective of the tobacco industry by
prohibiting both the FTC and state and local governments from requiring any
stronger warning labels on packages or in advertisements until at least 1969.20
The New York Times categorized the 1965 Act as “a shocking piece of special
interest legislation . . . a bill to protect the economic health of the tobacco
industry by freeing it of proper regulation.”21
The weak warning was eventually strengthened by the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (the 1969 Act), which changed the required
label to, “Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette
Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.”22 The legislation also prohibited
television and radio cigarette advertisements.23 Although the 1969 Act
strengthened the previous warning, it was still heavily influenced by the
interests of the tobacco industry.24 Before the passage of the 1969 Act, tobacco
companies successfully defeated an effort to add references to lung cancer and
other diseases in favor of the extremely vague warning.25
It was not until the passage of the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act
of 1984 (the 1984 Act) that warnings became more specific and informative.26
The 1984 Act created a rotational warning system still in use today that
requires both cigarette packages and advertisements to rotate four different
warnings every three months.27 The warnings link cigarette smoking to specific
adverse health effects such as lung cancer, emphysema, heart disease, and
pregnancy complications.28 While the 1984 Act made huge improvements to
the previous vague warnings, these outdated warnings are still in use today.29
Although the United States was the first country to require warning labels
on cigarette packages, it now requires one of the smallest, least prominent

19. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282,
283 (1965).
20. Id. at 282–83.
21. Editorial, Cigarettes vs. F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1965, at 28.
22. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970).
23. Id. § 6, 84 Stat. at 89.
24. Parascandola, supra note 13, at 675–76.
25. Id. at 676.
26. Comprehensive Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).
27. Id. § 4(a), 98 Stat. at 2203.
28. Id. § 4(a), 98 Stat. at 2202.
29. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
NATION app. C at 2 (2007) [hereinafter ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM].
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warnings compared to other countries.30 It is also one of the few countries left
in the developed world that has not updated its warnings in nearly thirty
years.31 Textual warnings are currently placed along one of the sides of
cigarette packages, using small typeface and similar colors to the rest of the
packaging.32 Canada, in contrast, requires one of sixteen different graphic
warnings to take up at least fifty percent of the visible surface of cigarette
packages.33 Each of the sixteen different warnings is accompanied by a brief
explanation, such as statistical support for that warning, along with a picture
illustrating that particular warning.34 In 2001, Canada became the first country
to require graphic warnings on cigarette packages, and since then at least sixtytwo other countries have followed suit including Australia, the United
Kingdom, Brazil, and Switzerland.35
B.

Decades of Deceit Uncovered

The facts in United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.36 highlight the
magnitude of deceit by tobacco companies. In 1999, the United States filed a
lawsuit against nine cigarette manufacturers and two tobacco-related trade
organizations created by the tobacco companies.37 The complaint alleged that
the defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) by participating in a “decades-long conspiracy” to deceive the
American public about the health risks and addictiveness of smoking
cigarettes.38 Specifically, the conspiracy involved (1) denying the serious
health risks associated with smoking and second-hand smoke, (2) denying the
addictiveness of cigarettes, and, in fact, manipulating cigarettes to be even
more addicting, (3) intentionally marketing to youth, and (4) concealing
evidence to cover up the dangers of smoking.39
After five years of discovery, nine months of trial, and around 14,000
exhibits,40 the district court issued a 987-page opinion that chronicled decades
of deceit by tobacco companies and ultimately found the defendants liable for
their conspiracy to defraud the American public about the dangers of

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. app. C at 2–3.
Id. app. C at 2.
Final Rule, supra note 9, at 69,529.
ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM, supra note 29, at 291–92.
Id.
CANADIAN CANCER SOCIETY, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS:
INTERNATIONAL STATUS REPORT 2–3 (3d ed. 2012); ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM, supra
note 29, at 291.
36. 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 1105.
38. Id. at 1105–06.
39. Id. at 1106.
40. Id.
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smoking.41 The court noted that for approximately fifty years, each of the
defendants “repeatedly, consistently, vigorously—and falsely—denied the
existence of any adverse health effects from smoking” despite their “massive”
internal documentation confirming these health effects.42 The court further
found that in response to the scientific consensus that cigarette smoking causes
lung cancer, the defendants launched “a campaign . . . designed to mislead the
public about the health consequences of smoking” in order to maximize
corporate profits.43
The defendants appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit, and the threejudge panel unanimously upheld the district court’s decision that found the
defendants liable.44 The court also upheld a majority of the district court’s
ordered remedies, including an injunctive order requiring the defendants to
issue corrective statements concerning the topics about which they had
previously deceived consumers.45 The defendants were required to publish the
statements in cigarette package inserts, retail displays, newspapers, on
television, and on their company websites.46 The court rejected the defendants’
arguments that the corrective statement requirements violated the First
Amendment and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.47
II. THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT
President Barack Obama signed the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act into law on June 22, 2009.48 The Act was introduced in
part to give the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products in response to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., which held that Congress had not given the FDA such authority.49 The
stated purpose of the Act is to provide the FDA with regulating authority in
order to “address issues of particular concern to public health officials,
especially the use of tobacco by young people and dependence on tobacco.”50
One of the most notable and controversial provisions includes a
requirement for new health warnings consisting of color graphics to illustrate
the dangers of smoking.51 The warnings are required to cover fifty percent of

41. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852 (D.D.C. 2006).
42. Id. at 208.
43. Id. at 187–88.
44. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1105.
45. Id. at 1138–45.
46. Id. at 1138.
47. Id. at 1140–45.
48. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009).
49. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
50. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 3(2), 123 Stat. at 1781.
51. Id. § 201(d), 123 Stat. at 1845.
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the front and back of cigarette packages.52 In addition, the Act limits the
advertising of tobacco products to minors,53 prohibits the sale of flavored
cigarettes,54 and requires tobacco companies to reveal all product ingredients
and seek FDA approval for any new tobacco products.55
In promulgating the Act, Congress included several legislative findings to
support its conclusion that tobacco use by adolescents is an issue “of particular
concern to public health officials.”56 Such findings include that almost all new
users of tobacco products are under the legal age to purchase such products,57
past efforts to restrict marketing have failed to adequately curb tobacco use
among children,58 and that children are more influenced by tobacco than
adults.59
In June 2011, the FDA released nine color graphics to illustrate
accompanying textual warnings that would be required to appear on every
cigarette package.60 The FDA chose the nine images from thirty-six proposed
images after considering approximately 1700 public comments and results
from its 18,000-person study of the effectiveness of the warnings.61 The study
was an internet-based consumer study examining the relative effectiveness of
the warnings at communicating the dangers of smoking to three target groups:
adults aged twenty-five and over, young adults aged eighteen to twenty-five,
and youth aged thirteen to seventeen who currently smoke or are susceptible to
smoking.62 Each group viewed a hypothetical cigarette package containing one
of the thirty-six graphic images, while the control group viewed a package with
no graphic images.63 The study then examined the emotional and cognitive
responses of each participant and measured each participant’s ability to recall
the content of the warning.64 The FDA stated that in selecting the nine images,
it considered all outcomes, but gave most weight to the “salience measures”—

52. Id. § 205(d), 123 Stat. at 1848–49.
53. Id. § 102(a), 123 Stat. 1831.
54. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1) (2012).
55. Id. § 387j.
56. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 2, 123 Stat. at 1776–81; Id. §
3(2), 123 Stat. at 1781.
57. Id. § 2(4), 123 Stat. at 1777.
58. Id. § 2(6), 123 Stat. at 1777.
59. Id. § 2(23), 123 Stat. at 1778.
60. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,628. The implementation date of the new warnings was
originally scheduled for September 2012, but is now uncertain due to the current litigation.
Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/
TobaccoProducts/Labeling/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/default.htm (last visited May, 22,
2013).
61. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,629, 36,637–38.
62. Id. at 36,367.
63. Id. at 36,638.
64. Id.
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that is, the participants’ cognitive and emotional responses.65 In support of this
methodology, the FDA cited research suggesting that “risk information is most
readily communicated by messages that arouse emotional reactions.”66
The selected images and textual warnings include: a body on an autopsy
table to illustrate the warning, “Smoking can kill you,” a man blowing smoke
out of the tracheotomy hole in his throat to accompany the warning,
“Cigarettes are addictive,” a man smoking while holding a baby to accompany
the warning, “Tobacco smoke can harm your children,” a cartoon image of a
baby in an incubator to depict the warning, “Smoking during pregnancy can
harm your baby,” side-by-side images of a diseased and healthy lung to
accompany the warning, “Smoking can cause fatal lung disease,” a patient
wearing an oxygen mask to accompany the warning, “Cigarettes cause strokes
and heart disease,” a man wearing an “I Quit” t-shirt to illustrate the warning,
“Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health,” a woman
crying to accompany the warning, “Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in
nonsmokers,” and a close-up image of mouth cancer lesions to illustrate,
“Cigarettes cause cancer.”67 Each graphic warning also includes the tobacco
quit line number, “1-800-QUIT-NOW.”68
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

Sixth Circuit Upholds Warnings in Discount Tobacco

On August 31, 2009, in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United
States, a group of tobacco manufacturers and retailers brought suit against the
United States, challenging the constitutionality of the Act.69 Specifically, the
companies challenged five provisions, including (1) the new requirements for
graphic warning labels, (2) restrictions on the commercial marketing of
modified risk tobacco products, (3) the prohibition on statements implicitly or
explicitly conveying an impression that tobacco products are approved by the
FDA, (4) the prohibition of color and graphics in tobacco advertisements, and
(5) the prohibition on the distribution of free samples or on sponsorship at
events.70 In particular, the plaintiffs contended that the mandated graphic
warnings violated the First Amendment right to free speech.71 Because the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 36,638–39.
Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,639.
Id. at 36,649–57, 36,696; see also Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 60.
Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,674; see also Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 60.
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 521 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 520.
Id. at 524.
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specific required images had not yet been released at the time the complaint
was filed, the plaintiffs made a facial challenge to the overall requirement.72
The district court granted summary judgment to the United States on the
challenges to the graphic warnings, along with the challenges to the restrictions
on the marketing of modified risk tobacco products and the prohibition on
sponsorship and distribution of free samples.73 In contrast, the district court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the other two challenges.74 Both
parties appealed.75
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Act’s
warning label requirements, with Judge Clay dissenting on the constitutionality
of the graphic images.76 The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the Act’s restriction of tobacco
advertising to black and white text and its upholding of the Act’s restriction on
marketing of modified-risk tobacco products and ban on sponsorship and free
sampling at events.77 The court reversed the district court’s holding regarding
the other two provisions.78
1.

Application of the Zauderer Rational-Basis Standard

In affirming the constitutionality of the Act’s new graphic warning
requirements, all three judges agreed that the proper level of scrutiny was the
rational-basis standard set forth in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of Supreme Court of Ohio.79
In Zauderer, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an
Ohio rule requiring attorneys who advertised contingency-fee services to
disclose in their advertisements that a losing client might still be responsible
for certain litigation fees.80 The Court reasoned that because the extension of
the First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified primarily by
protecting the flow of accurate information to the consumer, the commercial
speaker’s interest in not providing particular factual information is minimal.81
Thus, the standard for upholding required disclosures of factual information is

72. Id. at 553.
73. Id. at 521.
74. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 521.
75. Id. at 518.
76. Id. at 551.
77. Id. at 518.
78. Id.
79. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 554, 558 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (majority opinion)).
80. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 653 n.15.
81. Id. at 651.
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lower than the standard for upholding outright prohibitions on commercial
speech.82
Under the Zauderer rational-basis standard, disclosure requirements do not
violate the First Amendment so long as the requirement is reasonably related to
the government’s interest in preventing deception to consumers.83 In order for
Zauderer to apply, the required disclosure must involve purely factual
information and must be aimed at preventing consumer deception.84
The court in Discount Tobacco rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the
government must survive strict scrutiny.85 The plaintiffs relied on
Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich, in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invalidated an Illinois law requiring
video game retailers to place the label “18” on any game deemed to be
“sexually explicit,” thereby prohibiting the sale of that game to minors.86
There, the court applied strict scrutiny, reasoning that the labeling of a game as
“sexually explicit” constituted a “subjective and highly controversial
message.”87 The plaintiffs asserted that here, the government is similarly
attempting to convert tobacco companies into “its mouthpiece for a subjective
and highly controversial marketing campaign expressing its disapproval of
their lawful products.”88
Although all three judges agreed that the warnings in this case are
distinguishable from the label in Blagojevich, they based this distinction on
different grounds. Judge Stranch, writing for the majority, distinguished this
case from Blagojevich on the ground that the required disclosures in this case
involve factual information.89 The majority noted that whether a particular
video is “sexually explicit” is necessarily based on opinion stemming from
one’s own personal taste and morals.90 Thus, the required warning in
Blagojevich would force video game manufacturers to communicate the
government’s opinion that a game is sexually explicit.91 The graphic warnings
at issue in this case, however, provide undisputed factual information
regarding the health risks of smoking.92

82.
83.
84.
85.
2012).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 522, 527 (6th Cir.
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Judge Clay, writing for the dissent, agreed that the textual warnings
contained purely factual warnings not subject to the strict scrutiny standard.93
But unlike the majority, he asserted that there could be “no doubt” that the
graphic images are subjective based on their inherently persuasive nature.94 He
further noted that the visual images could not be categorized as “mere health
disclosure warnings” and thus the plaintiffs’ argument for strict scrutiny was
“not wholly unpersuasive.”95 In contrast to the majority’s distinction between
factual and subjective information, Judge Clay based his distinction on the
extent of the restrictions imposed by each required disclosure.96 In
Blagojevich, the warning required on video games deemed to be “sexually
explicit” was not simply a warning, but also carried an affirmative limitation
on speech in the form of a sales restriction.97 Conversely, the graphic warnings
in this case serve only as disclaimers and carry no affirmative limitation on
speech.98
2.

Analysis Under the Zauderer Standard

Under Zauderer’s rational-basis standard, the only question left for the
court was whether there existed a rational connection between the purpose of
the new warnings and the means used to achieve that purpose.99 The stated
purpose of the Act overall is to “address issues of particular concern to public
health officials, especially the use of tobacco by young people and dependence
on tobacco.”100 The purpose of the new warning requirements in particular is to
promote a greater understanding of the health risks associated with smoking.101
In finding that the new warning requirements are in fact reasonably related
to preventing consumer deception, the majority first pointed to the historical
deception of tobacco companies about the health risks associated with
smoking.102 The court cited to United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.103 to
highlight the “decades-long” conspiracy by tobacco companies to mislead

93. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 527 (Clay, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 526.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 526–27.
97. Id.
98. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 527 (Clay, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 561 (majority opinion).
100. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3(2), 123
Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009).
101. See id. § 202(b), 123 Stat. 1845–46 (authorizing the FDA to adjust the formatting of the
label requirements if necessary to “promote greater public understanding of the risks associated
with the use of tobacco products.”).
102. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562.
103. Id. (citing United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam)).
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consumers about the health risks of smoking.104 Thus, the court essentially
equated “preventing deception” to “balancing past deception.”
The majority next asserted that the existing warnings do not effectively
combat this deception for two primary reasons. First, the warnings are not
prominent enough, and are thus easily overlooked.105 The existing warnings
are printed along the side of cigarette packages and take up less than five
percent of the package surface.106 The court pointed to both the 1994 Report of
the Surgeon General and a 2007 Institute of Medicine report concluding that
the warnings go largely unnoticed by viewers and fail to convey relevant
information in an effective way.107 A second major problem with the current
warnings, as the court pointed out, is the fact that in order for viewers to
understand the warning, they must have a relatively high reading level.108 This
is especially problematic considering that the Act intends to prevent smoking
among youth.109 In the absence of more effective and attention-capturing
warnings, youths especially fail to fully understand the dangers of smoking.110
The court found that given these ineffective warnings, people do not fully
understand the dangers of tobacco use.111 The court cited the district court’s
opinion in Philip Morris, in which the court found that “[m]ost people do not
have a complete understanding of the many serious diseases caused by
smoking, the true nature of addiction, or what it would be like to experience
either those diseases or addiction itself. Rather, most people have only a
superficial awareness that smoking is dangerous.”112
As the court noted, the problems with the current warnings alone were not
enough to satisfy the rational-basis standard.113 The government must show a
rational connection between the warnings’ purpose and the means used to
achieve that purpose.114 The court applies the relatively low standard set forth
in Sorrell, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld a law requiring certain products to bear a warning label disclosing the
mercury content.115 The court in Sorrell found that the required disclosure
satisfied the rational-basis standard simply upon concluding that “[i]t is

104. Id.
105. Id. at 563.
106. Id.
107. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 563.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 539.
110. Id. at 563.
111. Id.
112. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 563 (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 449 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 578 (D.D.C. 2006)).
113. Id. at 564.
114. Id. at 561.
115. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
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probable that some mercury lamp purchasers, newly informed by the Vermont
label, will properly dispose of [the lamps] and thereby reduce mercury
pollution.”116 The Sixth Circuit noted that the decision in Sorrell did not point
to any evidence that the required disclosure would, in fact, change the behavior
of any consumers, but simply relied on “common sense.”117 Thus, the court
similarly assumed that it is probable, based on common sense, that the graphic
warning requirements would influence some consumers not to purchase
tobacco products.118
Ironically, the court actually used the plaintiffs’ own argument to support
its “common sense” assumption.119 In arguing against the Act’s ban on color
and graphics in tobacco advertisements, the plaintiffs asserted that such a
prohibition would inhibit their ability to “effectively communicate with adult
tobacco consumers using advertising that captures their attention.”120 The
plaintiffs further admitted at oral argument that “color and imagery are the
most effective way to get your ad noticed and communicate a message.”121
Therefore, the court held that the warnings were reasonably related to
promoting greater public understanding of the health risks associated with
tobacco use.122
B.

D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Warnings in R.J. Reynolds

After the FDA published its final rule releasing the nine required graphic
images in June, 2011,123 the “Big Five” tobacco companies, most of whom
were plaintiffs in Discount Tobacco, again filed suit against the FDA.124 This
time, rather than facially challenging the constitutionality of the warnings
requirement, they challenged the FDA’s promulgation of the specific graphic
warning labels incorporating textual warnings and the corresponding “1-800QUIT-NOW” hotline number.125
In striking down the Act, the court first held that a more stringent
intermediate scrutiny standard rather that the Zauderer rational-basis standard
applied.126 Second, the court found that the government did not produce a

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
2012).
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“shred of evidence” to show that the graphic warnings would directly advance
its interest in reducing smoking rates.127
1.

Application of the Central Hudson Intermediate Scrutiny Standard128

The court applied the same two-part test as in Discount Tobacco to
determine whether the Zauderer rational-basis standard applied, but came to
opposite conclusions on both prongs. The court concluded that, contrary to the
decision in Discount Tobacco, there was no evidence that the current cigarette
packages were deceiving.129 Thus, the graphic warnings could not be shown to
meet the first requirement established in Zauderer130—that is, that the
disclosure requirements are aimed at “preventing deception of consumers.”131
The court also ruled contrary to Discount Tobacco in finding that the
graphic warnings were not “purely factual and uncontroversial.”132 These
opposing conclusions, however, may be reconcilable based on the fact that in
Discount Tobacco, the court dealt with a facial challenge to the statute, and did
not consider the specific graphic images later released by the FDA. Thus, in
Discount Tobacco, the court held only that there could be graphic images that
were purely factual in nature.133 Here, however, the court found that the actual
graphic images released by the FDA were not purely factual.134 Rather, the
court considered the images to be “unabashed attempts to evoke emotion . . .
and browbeat consumers into quitting.”135 The D.C. Circuit offered examples
of the images that do not convey any factual information, including images of
a woman crying, a small child, and a man wearing a t-shirt declaring “I
QUIT.”136
Because the court found the required warnings to be neither factual nor
necessary to prevent deception, it determined that the Zauderer standard did
not apply.137 However, it disagreed with the district court’s application of a
strict scrutiny standard because “commercial speech receives a lower level of
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protection under the First Amendment.”138 The court therefore applied the
intermediate standard set forth in Central Hudson.139
2.

Warnings do not Survive Intermediate Scrutiny

Under the intermediate standard set forth in Central Hudson, the
government must first show that its asserted interest is substantial.140 If so, then
a court must next determine whether the regulation directly advances that
interest, and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to do so.141 The
government bears the burden of proving each element, and as the R.J. Reynolds
court noted, this burden “is not light.”142
The court considered the government’s asserted interest to be reducing
smoking rates.143 Unlike the court in Discount Tobacco, which considered the
more general purpose of promoting greater understanding of health risks
associated with smoking, the court here found that this “describes only the
means by which FDA is attempting to reduce smoking rates.”144 Thus, the
government faced the much heavier burden of producing evidence that the
warnings would directly lower smoking rates.
The court concluded, however, that the government did not produce a
“shred” of such evidence.145 The FDA produced substantial evidence regarding
the adoption of similar graphic warnings in Canada and Australia, along with
studies suggesting that such warnings contributed to a reduction in smoking
rates.146 However, the court found that such studies were too speculative and
failed to take into account other factors affecting the smoking rates.147
Judge Rogers, writing for the dissent, concluded not only that the less
stringent Zauderer standard applied, but also that the new warnings would
survive under either level of scrutiny.148 In concluding that the Zauderer
standard applied, Judge Rogers first found that the warnings were aimed at
preventing the deception of consumers.149 The dissent compared this case to
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation, in which the court
upheld, under the Zauderer standard, a rule requiring airlines to list the total
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Id.
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218.
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price as the most prominent number displayed.150 The Spirit Airlines court held
that it was “deceitful and misleading when the most prominent price listed by
an airline is anything other than the total, final price of air travel.”151 The
dissent here applied the same logic to conclude that cigarette packages that
“fail to display the final costs of smoking in a prominent manner are at least as
misleading as the airline advertisements in Spirit Airlines.”152
The dissent also disagreed with the majority in finding that the warnings
were factual in nature.153 Unlike the majority, which seemed to define “purely
factual” information as information that carries no emotional response,154 the
dissent based this distinction simply on whether the information is accurate,
noting that the “emotive quality of the selected images does not necessarily
undermine the warnings’ factual accuracy.”155
In addition to applying the less stringent Zauderer standard, the dissent
also considered the FDA’s broader interest in promoting greater public
understanding of the health risk associated with smoking.156 While the majority
dismissed this stated interest as “too vague to stand on its own,”157 the dissent
reasoned that in light of the serious public health consequences of smoking, the
government’s interest in effective communication about such consequences
“take[s] on added importance.”158 Unlike the majority, which pointed to the
government’s failure to produce a “shred of evidence,”159 the dissent found
that the government produced “substantial evidence” that the warnings would
survive under not only the Zauderer rational-basis standard, but also under the
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard.160
IV. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Should the U.S. Supreme Court decide to resolve the circuit split, it must
first decide which of the three standards discussed—Zauderer’s rational-basis
standard, Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard, or strict scrutiny—
correctly applies to the warnings. Part A explains why the Court should apply
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny to the warnings requirements. Part B
then analyzes the warnings under both Central Hudson and Zauderer.

150. Id.
151. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
152. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1232.
154. Id. at 1216 (majority opinion).
155. Id. at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1236.
157. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 1223 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)).
159. Id. at 1219 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 1236–38 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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Intermediate Scrutiny Should Apply

In order to evaluate the warnings as a whole, including the textual
statements, graphic images, and reference to “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” the U.S.
Supreme Court should apply Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny
standard.161
The Zauderer standard is not applicable for two reasons. First, the standard
only applies to disclosures that convey “purely factual and uncontroversial”
information.162 While the textual warnings certainly meet this requirement,
some of the accompanying graphic images do not. In support of the images, the
FDA itself cited research suggesting that “risk information is most readily
communicated by messages that arouse emotional reactions” and that
“warnings that generate an immediate emotional response from viewers can
confer negative feelings about smoking and undermine the appeal and
attractiveness of smoking.”163 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “[f]acts can
disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark controversy, and
even overwhelm reason, but that does not magically turn such facts into
opinions.”164 Although the fact that the images are intended to provoke an
emotional response does not necessarily defeat their factual nature, some of the
images do not convey factual information at all. For example, the photographs
of a healthy lung next to a smoker’s lung and a man with a tracheotomy are
purely factual in nature. Both photographs accurately convey common health
consequences of smoking. However, the images of a woman crying, a cartoon
drawing of a hospitalized baby, and a man wearing an “I Quit” t-shirt do not
convey “factual and uncontroversial” information about the adverse health
effects of smoking. Therefore, these specific images do not meet the first prong
of Zauderer.
Second, none of the graphic images meet the second requirement of
Zauderer because they are not aimed specifically at preventing consumer
deception. The FDA stated that the purpose of the warnings was to reduce
smoking among youth by promoting a greater understanding of the health risks
associated with smoking.165 In finding that the warnings were aimed at
preventing deception, the Sixth Circuit pointed to the “decades-long

161. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
162. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
163. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,635.
164. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012).
165. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 202(d),
123 Stat. 1776, 1777-78, 1845-466 (2009) (authorizing the FDA to adjust the formatting of the
label requirements if necessary to “promote greater public understanding of the risks associated
with the use of tobacco products.”).
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deception” by tobacco companies.166 Citing United States v. Philip Morris
USA Inc.,167 the court noted that tobacco companies “knowingly and actively
conspired to deceive the public about the health risks and addictiveness of
smoking for decades.”168 While this historical deception by tobacco companies
provides strong policy support for the graphic warnings, it is not relevant in
determining whether Zauderer applies. Zauderer explicitly applies to
disclosures that are reasonably related to “preventing consumer deception,”169
not balancing the effects of past deception. The FDA presented no evidence
suggesting that the current textual warnings are deceiving, just that they are not
effective.170 Thus, Zauderer does not apply.
Strict scrutiny also does not apply. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in
Central Hudson, “[t]he Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”171
Therefore, as noted in R.J. Reynolds, “burdens imposed on [commercial
speech] receive a lower level of scrutiny from the courts.”172 Both circuits were
therefore correct in rejecting the application of strict scrutiny. Because the
warnings involve compelled commercial speech, Central Hudson’s
intermediate scrutiny standard for regulations on commercial speech applies.
B.

Analysis Under Central Hudson and Zauderer
1.

Central Hudson’s Intermediate Scrutiny Standard

Under Central Hudson, a court must first determine whether the asserted
government interest is substantial.173 A key distinction between the Sixth and
D.C. Circuits’ analyses was the “government interest” under which the
warnings were analyzed. The Sixth Circuit analyzed the warnings under the
government’s stated interest in “promoting greater public understanding of the
risks” associated with smoking,174 while the D.C. Circuit analyzed the
warnings under the government’s interest in directly reducing smoking rates.175

166. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562.
167. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
168. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562.
169. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 657
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
170. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 69,529.
171. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63
(1980).
172. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (per curiam)).
173. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
174. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 564 (6th Cir. 2012).
175. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221.
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The latter interest imposes a significantly high burden on the government to
prove that the warnings will directly advance that interest. Under the first
interest, the government would satisfy its burden by providing evidence
showing that more people will notice, read, and understand the warnings.
Under the second interest, however, the government would only satisfy the
burden by providing direct evidence that the warnings will in fact cause people
to quit smoking, which, as explained below, is impossible to prove. Thus, the
government interest considered by the Court would likely determine the
outcome of the case.
The warnings should be analyzed under the government’s stated interest in
“promoting greater public understanding of the risks” associated with
smoking.176 The D.C. Circuit viewed this interest as describing “only the
means by which FDA is attempting to reduce smoking rates,” which it
considered to be “too vague to stand on its own.”177 However, the fact that
effectively conveying information describes a means of lowering smoking
rates does not necessarily make it too vague. Under this same logic, reducing
smoking rates could be characterized as simply describing a means of
improving the health of American citizens. Given the substantial interest of the
government in reducing smoking among youth, effective communication of the
dangers of smoking is simply a more narrowly defined interest that should not
be dismissed as “too vague.”178 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit failed to take
into account the impossibility of providing direct evidence to prove that these
warnings would directly reduce smoking rates. Because the warnings have not
yet been put into effect, any statistical predictions would necessarily be
speculative. As the court itself noted, many factors determine a person’s
decision to smoke,179 and it would be impossible to isolate the effect of new
warnings on a person’s decision to quit or decline to start smoking. Therefore,
the Court should analyze the more narrowly focused interest in promoting
greater public understanding of the negative health consequences of smoking.
The government’s interest in reducing smoking rates, particularly among
youth, by more effectively communicating the health risks associated with
smoking is clearly a substantial interest. Smoking remains the nation’s largest
public health problem.180 Tobacco use claims the lives of 440,000 Americans
every year.181 Smoking accounts for more deaths than AIDS, alcohol use,
cocaine use, heroin use, homicides, suicides, car accidents, and fires
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combined.182 Smoking is the leading cause of preventable death in the United
States, and more than eighty percent of smokers have their first cigarette before
turning eighteen.183 Almost half (46.3%) of young Americans in grades nine
through twelve have tried smoking, and 19.5% are current smokers.184
Smoking also involves a high risk of lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema,
and pregnancy complications.185 The current warnings have been proven to go
largely unnoticed and fail to effectively convey the dangers of smoking,
especially to youth.186
In addition to the many serious health consequences of smoking, it is also
important to note that tobacco use has taken an economic toll on America.187
Health care expenditures for smoking-related conditions are estimated to be
around eighty-nine billion dollars each year.188 Lost work productivity as a
result of death from tobacco use totals more than ninety-two billion dollars
annually.189 The government has a substantial interest in promoting public
understanding of these risks in order to (1) protect the health of Americans and
(2) lower the nation’s health care costs associated with smoking.
Second, to survive intermediate scrutiny, the warning requirements must
directly advance the government’s interest in promoting greater public
understanding of the health risks of smoking.190 The FDA presented extensive
evidence that the current textual warnings are ineffective and go largely
unnoticed, especially by adolescents.191 One study of adolescents viewing
tobacco advertisements showed that 63.3% of the adolescents did not even
view the warning long enough to read any of its words, and most of the
adolescents were unable to recall the warning or even recognize it from a
list.192 Another study found that 85% of Canadian smokers cited cigarette
packages (which, in Canada, require prominent pictorial warnings) as a source
of health information, while only 47% of American smokers cited packages as
a source of health information.193 Furthermore, another study showed that
participants voluntarily viewed the graphic warnings on Canadian packages for
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longer periods of time than the textual warnings in the United States.194
Finally, the FDA cited research suggesting that graphic warning labels are (1)
more likely to be noticed than text-only warnings, (2) more effective at
conveying the health risks associated with smoking, and (3) associated with
increased motivation to quit smoking.195
Another key problem with the current textual warnings is that viewers
must have a relatively high reading level in order to understand the
warnings.196 The warnings “require a college reading level”197 and are
therefore ineffective at conveying information to many young Americans,
adults with low education levels or reading disabilities, and those for whom
English is not their first language. Smoking rates are higher among adults with
low education levels.198 For example, 49.1% of adults with a General
Education Development certificate and 28.5% of adults with less than a high
school diploma were current smokers in 2009, compared with 5.6% of adults
with a graduate degree.199 As the FDA noted, graphic warnings would provide
a “particularly important communication tool” for these individuals, as
evidence suggests that countries with graphic health warnings show fewer
disparities in health knowledge across educational levels.200
Finally, Central Hudson requires that the warnings must not be more
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest.201 Some would
argue that the government could pursue other options to promote
understanding of the health risks associated with tobacco, such as an
advertising campaign. However, unlike the warning labels, no advertising
campaign is guaranteed to reach every teenager at the moment they are
considering whether to purchase their first package of cigarettes. As the FDA
has shown, the only way to more effectively capture the attention of this
critical viewer at the most critical time is to include graphic, color images on
every cigarette package.202 Therefore, the graphic warning labels should be
upheld under Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard.
2.

Zauderer’s Rational Basis Standard

Although unlikely, the U.S. Supreme Court could agree with the Sixth
Circuit in finding that Zauderer applies. This would require the Court to find
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the graphic images to be both factual in nature and intended to prevent
deception by balancing the effects of the “decades-long deception” by the
tobacco industry.203 Since the Court would already have equated “preventing
deception” with balancing past deception in order for Zauderer to apply, the
government would bear the much lower burden of proving that the graphic
images are “reasonably related” to balancing the past deception of tobacco
companies.204 The use of color images to more effectively capture consumers’
attention would certainly help to balance out the “decades-long” deception by
tobacco companies.205
It is also possible that the Court could analyze the images individually
under Zauderer, upholding only those images that it determines to be “purely
factual and uncontroversial.”206 Many of the images factually portray the
effects of smoking, including the photograph of a man blowing smoke out of
the tracheotomy hole in his throat, the photograph of decaying teeth and
lesions caused by mouth cancer, and the photographs of a healthy lung next to
a smoker’s lung. These images, paired together with the accompanying textual
warnings, essentially convey the factual message that “this is a common
consequence of smoking.” However, it is hard to imagine that some of the
other images could be found to convey “purely factual” information. For
example, the cartoon image of a baby in a hospital, the photograph of a woman
crying, and the picture of man wearing an “I Quit” t-shirt do not convey factual
information about the dangers of smoking. Thus, it is possible that the Court
could uphold only some of the FDA’s images under the Zauderer standard.
CONCLUSION
The United States was the first country to introduce tobacco warning
labels, and now, ironically, it requires one of the least prominent warnings
compared to other countries. Extensive research shows that the current textual
warnings go largely ignored and unnoticed, and that prominent, colorful
images are necessary to more effectively communicate the health risks
associated with smoking. Given that smoking remains the leading cause of
preventable death in the United States and that most smokers have their first
cigarette before the legal age of eighteen, the government certainly has a
substantial interest in promoting public awareness of the serious health risks
associated with smoking. As substantial evidence shows, graphic color images
are the only way to more effectively capture the attention of American

203. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 562 (6th Cir. 2012).
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adolescents at the time they pick up their first package of cigarettes. Therefore,
the U.S. Supreme Court should break away from the historical influence and
deception of tobacco companies and uphold the new graphic warning labels as
constitutional under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard.
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